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Measuring Smile Curves in Global Value Chains
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Abstract
The concept and logic of the “smile curve” in the context of global value chains has been
widely used and discussed at the individual firm level, but rarely identified and investigated
at the country and industry levels by using real data. This paper proposes an idea, based on
an inter-country input-output model, to consistently measure both the strength and length
of linkages between producers and consumers along global value chains. This idea allows
for better identification and mapping of smile curves for countries and industries according
to their positions and degrees of participation in a given conceptual value chain. Using the
1995-2011 World Input-Output Tables, several conceptual value chains are investigated,
including exports of electrical and optical equipment from China and Mexico and exports of
automobiles from Japan and Germany. The identified smile curves provide a very intuitive
and visual image, which can significantly improve our understanding of the roles played
by different countries and industries in global value chains. Further, the smile curves help
identify the benefits gained by these countries and industries through their participation
in global trade.
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1 Introduction
The rise of global value chains (GVCs) is considered one of the most important features of
the rapid economic globalization in recent decades. The economic and popular literature has
described phenomena relating to the rise of GVCs from different perspectives, such as frag-
mentation (Jones and Kierzkowski, 1990), offshore sourcing (Arndt, 1997), external orientation
(Campa and Goldberg, 1997), disintegration of production (Feenstra, 1998), global production
sharing (Yeats, 2001), vertical specialization (Hummels et al., 2001; Yi, 2003), outsourcing
(Grossman and Helpman, 2002a,b), vertical production networks (Hanson et al., 2003), trade
in tasks (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008), the second great unbundling (Baldwin, 2011),
and so on. Despite the use of these different terms, they all point to the same fact: value chains
are sliced up in tasks and functions globally. That is to say, goods are produced “in a number
of stages in a number of locations, adding a little bit of value at each stage” (Krugman, 1995).
The theoretical cause for this shift is the reduction of service link costs (Jones and Kierzkowski,
1990), including the costs of trade, investment, coordination, and communications. Lower costs
for these service links has enabled the international unbundling of factories and offices, which
means that tasks can also be traded globally.
There are several positive aspects of GVCs, from the viewpoint of development economics.
First, firms, especially in developing economies, do not need to build a whole course of produc-
tion capacity. Instead, they just need to use their comparative advantages to concentrate in a
specific production process, which makes participation in the global economy possible (Kowal-
ski et al., 2015). Second, becoming a part of GVCs can create more employment opportunities
(UNCTAD, 2013). For example, jobs are created in developing countries from iPhone assembly
in China, call centers operations in the Philippines and India, Nike shoes production in Viet-
nam, and automobile and auto part production in Mexico and Thailand. Third, GVCs also
provide the opportunity for technology transfer or spillover to developing countries through
local learning (Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2010; Kawakami et al., 2012).
However, as mentioned in the OECD-WTO-World Bank Group report (2014), “Gains from
GVC participation are not automatic. Benefits of GVCs can also vary considerably depending
on whether a country operates at the high or at the low end of the value chain.” Regarding
the costs and risks of joining GVCs, a paradoxical pair of concerns between developed and
developing countries may exist (e.g., Baldwin et al., 2014). Namely, because of the differences
in comparative advantages across countries in GVCs, rich countries may tend to engage in
high-end and intangible production activities such as R&D, design, and brand building in the
pre-fabrication stages and after-sales services and marketing in the post-fabrication stages.
Thus, rich countries may worry about the hallowing out of their economies as manufacturing
jobs are offshored to low-technology, low-wage nations. Poor nations, on the other hand, may
tend to focus on low-end and tangible production activities such as manufacturing and assembly.
Thus, they may be increasingly worried that they are getting the wrong sorts of jobs and that
their economies could be locked into GVCs at the bottom of the so-called “smile curve.”
The concept of the smile curve was first proposed around 1992 by Stan Shih, the founder
of Acer, a technology company headquartered in Taiwan. Shih (1996) observed that in the
personal computer industry, both ends of the value chain command higher values added to the
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product than the middle part of the value chain. If this phenomenon is presented in a graph
with a Y-axis for value-added and an X-axis for value chain (see Figure 13), the resulting curve
appears in the shape of a smile. The smile curve logic has been widely used and discussed in
the context of GVCs (e.g., Mudambi, 2008; Shin et al., 2012). However, most research has
focused on firm-level analysis, rather than the economy-wide implications concerning (1) what
relationship exists between developed and developing countries in the creation and distribution
process of value-added in GVCs; (2) whether smile curves are deepening or becoming flatter in
GVCs; (3) whether developing countries have been locked into the low end of GVCs; (4) which
policies can help countries keep or improve their competitiveness in the smile curve; and (5)
how developing countries are able to integrate into GVCs successfully and then move up from
the low end to high end of the smile curve. Better answers to these questions are crucial for
designing effective development strategies, industrial policies, and international governance.
Figure 1: Conceptual framework of the smile curve
(Source: Mudambi, 2008.)
The logic of smile curve has been widely used in case studies of individual firms, but
rarely identified, measured, and evaluated at the country level by using real data with explicit
consideration of international production networks. The paper aims to identify smile curves
from this broader perspective by taking advantage of existing international input-output (IO)
measures to understand the degree and position of different countries’ participation in GVCs.
Concerning the measurement of GVC participation, two main approaches are widely used.
The first approach is based on the collection of survey data for a specific firm or product.
For example, case studies examining China’s role in Apple’s supply chain (e.g., Linden et al.,
2009; Dedrick et al., 2010) have received a great deal of attention. Xing and Detert (2010)
examined the case of the iPhone and found that value added by China contributed just 3.6%
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to the $2.0 billion of iPhone exports to the US in 2009; the remainder of the value-added was
from Germany, Japan, Korea, the US, and other countries. These studies rely on “tear down”
analyses that assign the value of individual components to source companies and their countries.
These firm- and product-based case studies can provide an intuitive understanding of GVCs
in terms of the activities of multinational enterprises. However, these “tear down” case studies
focus on only the supply chain of a specific firm and particular products, and are clearly not
representative of the broader role of production networks and inter-industrial linkages in the
whole value creation process. For example, when we examine the role of the Chinese economy
in global production networks as a whole, the share of domestic value-added through gross
exports of final products shipped to the United States was actually about 75% in 2009.
The second approach to measuring GVC participation is based on IO tables. Hummels et
al. (2001) first proposed a measure based on the share of vertical specialization (VS) or the
import content of exports by using single-nation IO tables. The VS share avoids the shortcom-
ings of firm- or product-based measures to some extent since it can capture the intermediate
imports used directly and indirectly to produce exports with consideration given to domestic
inter-industrial production linkages. However, it should be noted that in a national IO table,
imports and exports are treated as exogenous variables; the so-called spill-over and feedback
effects from the rest of the world cannot be fully considered in the VS measure (e.g., imported
intermediate goods may also include domestic content). In response to the limitations of the VS
measure, international IO tables, which consist of detailed information on both inter-country
and inter-industry linkages, have been used to measure GVCs in recent years. Studies taking
this approach include Johnson and Noguera (2012), Stehrer (2012), Timmer et al. (2014a),
and Koopman et al. (2014). Most of these papers, with the exception of Koopman et al.
(2014), discuss the connections between their approaches and the approach of Hummels et al.
(2001) in broad terms. Koopman et al. (2014) provides a unified mathematical framework for
completely decomposing gross exports into its various components, including exported value-
added, returning domestic value-added, foreign value-added, and other additional items that
may be double counted. This framework establishes a precise relationship between value-added
measures of trade and official trade statistics, which thus providing an observable benchmark
for value-added trade estimates.
Most of the existing measures mentioned above focus on showing the degree to which a
country participates in GVCs, rather than its position in GVCs explicitly. A better under-
standing of the increasing complexity and sophistication of production networks requires new
measures that can capture the “length” of the linkages between countries or industries or be-
tween producers and consumers for mapping the geometry of value chains. Dietzenbacher et al.
(2005, 2007) proposed a new concept, the average propagation length (APL), to measure the
number of production stages in production networks. The international application of the APL
framework was brought into the Asian context and extended by Inomata (2008) and Escaith
and Inomata (2013) through a time-series analysis using the Asian International IO tables.
Fally (2011, 2012) characterized the position along a production line in terms of the distance
to final use. Namely, industries that sell a relatively larger share of their outputs to industries
further upstream are defined as being “more upstream”. Antras et al. (2012) proposed the
concept of “upstreamness”, which is the number of stages that the product goes through before
reaching the final demand. They also prove that their concept of “upstreamness” is consistent
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with Fally’s (2011, 2012) distance definition. In addition, Miller and Temurshoev (2013) pro-
posed two other indicators to identify the upstreamness and downstreamness of an industry.
A recent paper by Chen (2014) extended the APL to group-wise APL, a general mathematical
framework. In his work, both APL and the upstreamness measure by Antras et al. (2012) are
proved to be special cases of the group-wise APL.
In contrast to the existing measures of “length” and “distance” in the GVC literature, our
paper proposes a generalized and consistent accounting system that can be used to measure
the distance in production networks between producers and consumers at the country, industry,
and product levels from different economic perspectives. The important feature of our measure
for distance is that we focus on the “value-added” propagation process in GVCs and provide
more flexible ways to measure the position of countries and industries along GVCs. The most
important contribution of this paper is that we provide some conceptual designs based on the IO
technique to represent the process for the creation and distribution of value-added along GVCs
in detail. For example, our measure can be used to examine the GVC concerning a specific
good made in China that is consumed in the US, such as the case of iPhone. Using measures for
both the strength and length of linkages between producers and consumers and the conceptual
designs of GVCs, the identification of various economy-wise smile curves in GVCs becomes
possible based on real data, in this case from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD)1.
2 Methodology
2.1 Value added creation process in a closed economy
Our methodology is rooted in Leontief (1936) whose work demonstrates the complex linkages
among different industries in an economy can be expressed as various inter-industry transac-
tions organized into chessboard-type matrices, known as IO tables. Each column in the table
represents the required inputs from other industries (including imports and direct value-added)
to produce the given amount of the product represented by that column. After normalization,
the technical coefficient table represents the amount and type of intermediate inputs needed
in the production of one unit of gross output. Using these coefficients, the gross output in
all domestic stages of production that is needed to produce one unit of final products can be
estimated via the so-called Leontief inverse. When the output flows associated with a partic-
ular level of final demand are known, the total value-added throughout the economy can be
estimated by multiplying these output flows with the value-added ratio (amount of value-added
per unit of gross output) in each industry.
1The WIOD (www.wiod.org) provides world input-output tables for each year since 1995 covering 40 coun-
tries, including all 27 countries of the European Union (as of January 1, 2007) and 13 other major economies
(see Appendix 1). These 40 countries represent more than 85 percent of world GDP. It contains data for 35
industries covering the overall economy, including agriculture, mining, construction, utilities, 14 manufacturing
industries, and 17 services industries (see Appendix 2). The tables have been constructed by combining national
input-output tables with bilateral international trade data, following the conventions of the System of National
Accounts. For detailed information about the WIOD, see Timmer et al. (2014b).
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In a national I-O table,
X = AX + Y (1)
where X is the N×1 gross output vector, Y is theN×1 final demand vector, and A is theN×N
IO technical coefficient matrix. In other words, all gross output (total supply) must be used
either as an intermediate good or a final good (total demand). After rearranging terms, we can
have
X = (I − A)−1Y = BY (2)
where B denotes the N ×N block matrix, commonly known as a Leontief inverse, which is the
total requirement matrix that gives the amount of gross output required for a one-unit increase
in final demand. The relationship expressed in equation (2) is the Leontief insight. Under the
common assumptions for solvability of the equations, B also can be expressed as a power series.
B = I + A2 + A3 + · · · (3)
The effects on the gross output X due to a demand pull Y which is given in equation
(2), can be interpreted as a stepwise or round-by-round procedure in equation (3). The initial
effect in round 0 states that Y itself needs to be produced. In order to produce this additional
output, extra intermediate inputs are required directly, amounting to AY in round 1. Next,
these extra intermediate inputs AY need to be produced themselves, requiring A2Y of additional
intermediate inputs in round 2, and so forth. Therefore, the effects of gross output effects X
thus consist of an initial effect Y , a direct effect AY and indirect effects (A2 + A3 + · · · )Y .
In an IO table, we define V as a 1×N direct value-added coefficient vector. Each element
of V shows the share of direct value-added in gross output. This is equal to one minus the
intermediate input share:
V = u[I − A] (4)
where u is a 1×N unit vector. The elements in the direct value-added coefficient vector V can
be also re-written as the following form:
vj = vaj/xj = 1−
n∑
i
aij (5)
where, vaj is the direct value-added of industry j. Then, we can define the total value-added
coefficient (V B) matrix as follows:
V B =
[
v1 v2 · · · vn
]

b11 b12 · · · b1n
b21 b22 · · · b2n
...
... . . .
...
bn1 bn2 · · · bnn
 =

v1b11 + v2b21 + · · ·+ vnbn1
v1b12 + v2b22 + · · ·+ vnbn2
...
v1b1n + v2b2n + · · ·+ vnbnn

T
(6)
Note that each element in the last term of equation (6) equals unity (Koopman et al., 2014).
Then, we can decompose the industry level value-added and final goods production as a direct
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application of the Leontief insight expressed as follows:
Vˆ BYˆ =

v1 0 · · · 0
0 v2 · · · 0
...
... . . .
...
0 0 · · · vn


b11 b12 · · · b1n
b21 b22 · · · b2n
...
... . . .
...
bn1 bn2 · · · bnn


y1 0 · · · 0
0 y2 · · · 0
...
... . . .
...
0 0 · · · yn

=

v1b11y1 v1b12y2 · · · v1b1nyn
v2b21y1 v2b22y2 · · · v2b2nyn
...
... . . .
...
vnbn1y1 vnbn2y2 · · · vnbnnyn

(7)
The matrix in equation (7) shows the estimates of industrial value-added in final goods produc-
tion. Each element in the matrix represents the value-added from a source industry directly or
indirectly used in the production of final goods. In the matrix, walking along the row yields
the distribution of value-added created from one industry used across all industries. Therefore,
summing up the ith row of the matrix, we obtain the total value-added created by production
factors employed in the ith industry. In other words, it equals the GDP of the ith industry.
Expressing this mathematically, we have
vi(bi1y1 + bi2y2 + · · ·+ binyn) = vai = GDPi (8)
At the same time, in the same matrix, a column yields the contributions of value-added from
all industries to the final goods produced by a particular industry. Adding up all elements in
the jth column equals the total value of final goods by the jth industry, as shown by
v1b1jyj + v2b2jyj + · · ·+ vnbnjyj = yj (9)
These two different ways that decompose value-added and final goods production have their
own economic interpretations and thus play different roles in economic analysis. In summary,
the sum of the Vˆ BYˆ matrix across columns along a row accounts for how each value-added
originating in a particular industry is used by the industry itself and all its downstream indus-
tries. It traces forward industrial linkages across all downstream industries from a supply-side
perspective. Since the sum of the Vˆ BYˆ matrix across the rows along a column accounts for all
upstream industries’ value-added induced by a specific final good, it traces backward industrial
linkages across upstream industries from a user’s perspective. Based on the identity (equation
(6)), all these sources should sum to 100% of the value of final products for any given industry.
2.2 Value added propagation length
In this section, we define the value-added propagation length from producers to consumers
in a closed economic system. We have shown how value-added can be propagated through both
forward and backward industrial linkages in an economy in equations (8) and (9) above. These
two equations can be further transformed to
vi
vai
(bi1y1 + bi2y2 + · · ·+ binyn) = 1 (10)
v1b1j + v2b2j + · · ·+ vnbnj = 1 (11)
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Re-writing the above equations as matrix form, we get
Vˆ BY/VA = Vˆ (I + A+ A2 + A3 + · · · )Y/VA = u (12)
V B = V (I + A+ A2 + A3 + · · · ) = uT (13)
where, u denotes a N × 1 unit vector and VA denotes the value-added vector in IO table. In
this paper, we define “/” as an element-wise vector division operator. In equation (12), the first
term V IY/VA in the expansion form indicates the share of value-added absorbed by all final
demand through the round 0 production process via forward industrial linkages in total value-
added by industry. The second term V AY/VA represents the share of value-added absorbed
by all final demand through round 1 of the production process via forward industrial linkages
in total value-added by industry. The remaining terms show the induced value-added share
in subsequent rounds of production processes via forward industrial linkages. Alternatively,
in equation (13), the first term V I in the expanded form indicates the national value-added
induced by one unit of final demand on a specific product through the round 0 production
process via backward industrial linkages. The second term V A in the expanded form indicates
the national value-added induced by one unit of final demand for a specific product through
round 1 of the production process via backward industrial linkages. The remaining terms show
the induced national value-added in subsequent rounds of production processes via backward
industrial linkages.
On the basis of the explanation of equations (12) and (13), the logic of APL (Dietzenbacher
et al., 2005), and the concept of “upstreamness” (Antras et al., 2012), the industrial value-added
propagation length through both forward and backward industrial linkages can be defined by
using a weighted expression as shown below.
Definition 1: Forward industrial linkage-based value-added propagation length:
U = Vˆ (1I + 2A+ 3A3 + · · · )Y/VA = Vˆ (0I + 1A+ 2A2 + · · · )Y/VA+ u
= Vˆ B2Y = Vˆ (B2 −B)Y/VA+ u (14)
The index U measures the total number of stages, on average, through which the value-added
of a specific industry reaches all final demand users by the way of forward industrial linkages.
It can be simplified as the distance from a specific industry (value-added creator) to consumers.
If U is a relatively large figure for a specific industry, it indicates that this industry is located in
the upstream portion of the value chain since its value-added goes through many downstream
production stages before reaching final users. On the other hand, a lower value of U indicates
that the industry is closer to the downstream portion of the value chain since only a small
number of stages are needed for this industry’s value-added inputs to reach final users.
Definition 2: Backward industrial linkage-based value-added propagation length:
D = V (1I + 2A+ 3A3 + · · · ) = V (0I + 1A+ 2A2 + · · · ) + uT
= V B2 = V (B2 −B) + uT (15)
The index D measures the average number of production stages for a specific final product
when it induces the value-added for all industries by the way of backward industrial linkages
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in the whole value chain. Unlike the index U, it is difficult to identify the position of a specific
industry in value chains by using index D since it is measured from the perspective of the final
user. In other words, D represents the length from a specific final product to all industries via
the value-added propagation process. Therefore, compared to U, D can be simplified as the
distance from a specific consumer (who consumes a specific final product) to suppliers.
It should be noted that both U and D give an average level of value-added propagation
length by industry. These measures are similar to the “distance”-related definitions used in the
literature. However, to slice up GVCs at more detailed levels, we need to define the distance
from a specific supplier or a group of suppliers to a specific consumer or a group of consumers
as shown below.
Given the same closed IO system, the value-added of a specific industry s (value-added
creator or product supplier) induced by the demand of a specific final product k can be given
as VsBYk, where Vs =
[
0 0 · · · vs · · · 0
]
, represents the value-added input coefficient of
industry s and Yk =
[
0 0 · · · yk · · · 0
]T represents consumers’ demand on a final product
k. If we denote vsbskyk = vask, then vsbskykvask = 1 . For all value-added industries, the following
relation holds in definition
Vˆ BYk/VAk = Vˆ (I + A+ A
2 + A3 + · · · )Yk/VAk = u (16)
Following the definition of U, the value-added propagation length from sector s to final product
k(Usk, a scalar) can be given as follows:
Usk = Vs(1I + 2A+ 3A
2 + · · · )Yk/vask = VsB2Yk/vask (17)
The above definition can also be given as a vector form for all industries:
Uk = Vˆ (1I + 2A+ 3A
2 + · · · )Yk/VAk = Vˆ B2Yk/VAk (18)
where, Uk is a N × 1 vector showing the industrial value-added propagation length to a specific
final product k; VAk =
[
va1k va2k · · · vank
]T ; vibikyk = vaik.
For a group of final products, YG =
[
0 0 · · · yGm · · · 0
]
,m ∈ G , we get
G∑
m
vibimy
G
m =
vaig and VAG =
[
va1G va2G · · · vanG
]T . Thus, the average distance from a specific industry
to a group of final products G can be given as follows:
UG = Vˆ (1I + 2A+ 3A
2 + · · · )YG/VAG = Vˆ B2YG/VAG (19)
It is easy to know that UG = U , when the group G is the entire final demand vector in the IO
system, YG = Y .
The above definition for various lengths is from the perspective of the value-added creator
(industry) and it measures the distance (the number of propagation stages) from a specific in-
dustry to a specific final product or a group of final products. From the consumers’ perspective,
Usk can also be defined as Dsk representing the value-added propagation length from a specific
final product k to a specific industry s.
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If we donote vsbsjyj = vasj, then
vsbsjyj
vasj
= 1, Let VAs =
[
vas1 vas2 · · · vasn
]T .
By definiton, we have
VsBYˆ /VAs = Vs(I + A+ A
2 + · · · )Yˆ /VAs = uT (20)
Following the same manner used in the definition of Uk, the value-added propagation length
from final products to a specific industry can be given as:
Ds = Vs(1I + 2A+ 3A
2 + · · · )Yˆ /VAs = VsB2Yˆ /VAs (21)
For a group of sectors T , VT =
[
0 0 · · · vTm · · · 0
]
,m ∈ T , let
T∑
m
vTmbmjyj = vaTj and
VAT =
[
vaT1 vaT2 · · · vaTn
]T , then the value-added propagation length from a specific final
product to a group of value-added creators (industries) can be given as
DT = VT (1I + 2A+ 3A
2 + · · · )Yˆ /VAT = VTB2Yˆ /VAT (22)
Also when the group T covers the entire industries, VT = V , we can simply have DT = D.
The above indicators can be applied to a closed inter-country IO system. This can yield
various distances depending on the definition of final product group or industry group. For
example, grouping the all final products in the US, we can easily measure the U distance from
specific Chinese industries to the US consumer. By grouping the entire final products of the
world, the U distance from specific Chinese industries to the world market can be measured;
by grouping the value-added of Chinese industries, we can also measure the D distance from
a specific final product consumed in the US to Chinese producers. Grouping the entire value-
added industries of the world allows us to measure the D distance from the specific final product
consumed in the US to all producers.
2.3 Conceptual GVC settings
To give a more detailed mapping of the geometry of GVCs, we need three fundamental
measures. The first one is the strength of linkages between countries or industries in the
value-added propagation process; the second one is the length (distance) of linkages between
producers and consumers in the value-added propagation process; the third one is the definition
of the GVC itself. The measure for strength can be used to express the magnitude of the benefit
(i.e., the absolute gain of value-added) for the country or industry that is involved in GVCs.
The measure for length can be used to identify the position of a country or an industry in
the value-added creation process. These two measures have been given in Section 2.1 and 2.2
respectively. The remaining work for this section is to create a conceptual GVC design.
GVCs can be seen from various perspectives. The most popular and simple GVC setting
can focus on the export of a specific product and look at how value is added from one country or
industry to another country or industry along whole production networks, and how the product
is ultimately consumed by consumers. Take the case of an iPhone that is designed in California
(US), assembled in China, and consumed in the US. Next, suppose the iPhone industry is
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reflected in China’s part of an inter-country IO table. Then, it is easy to use China’s iPhone
exports to the US as a starting point for separating the whole value chain into pre-fabrication
stages and post-fabrication stages. All countries and industries that directly and indirectly
provide intermediate goods and services to China’s production (assembly) of iPhone can be
considered as participants in the pre-fabrication stages along the value chain. All countries and
industries involved in the distribution process of imported iPhone to the US consumers can be
considered as participants in the post-fabrication stages along the value chain.
Using the logic of Leontief’s backward linkage, we can calculate the value-added by country
and industry induced in the pre-fabrication stages by China’s exports of the iPhone to the US
in an inter-country IO system. In the same manner (Leontief’s backward linkage), we can also
measure the value-added induced in the post-fabrication stages by country and industry from
commerce, transportation, and marketing services (markup or margin) when imported iPhones
are delivered to the US consumers, assuming that there is no difference in markup rate across
products in the US domestic market2. By picking up the most important participants with
value-added gain above a threshold percentage (e.g., 1% of the total induced value-added in
the whole value chain) in both pre-fabrication and post-fabrication stages in the iPhone GVC,
a map of the iPhone GVC can be created. Specifically in this map, the value-added ratio (i.e.,
value-added gain by producing one unit of output) is used as the measure on the Y-axis and
the distance from industry to the US consumers (forward industrial linkage-based measure, U)
is used as the measure on the X-axis. The above conceptual GVC setting can also be applied to
the case of Japanese cars, Italian designer clothes, and any other specific final product or group
of final products. This GVC mapping can finally help us identify if the so-called “smile curve”
exists, and if so, what it looks like in the GVC context. It should be noted that in our example
we trace the most benefited participants in the iPhone GVC by using a measure of strength
based on Leontief’s backward industrial linkage, and identify the position of these participants
by using the measure of length based on Leontief’s forward industrial linkage.
3 Empirical results
3.1 Industry upstreamness and downstreamness in the value-added
creation process
As mentioned before, the two measures for value-added propagation length, U and D, are
equivalent at both the aggregated average level (for all countries and industries in a closed
inter-country IO system) and the lowest level (between an industry and a final product). In
order to check how the fragmentation of production in GVCs has changed over time, we first
calculate the aggregated average U (or D) for the whole world from 1995 and 2011 using the
WIOD and show the result in Figure 2.
Obviously, the value-added propagation length for the whole GVCs shows an increasing
tendency, especially after 2002. It first peaked in 2008 and then had a short decline after the
2If IO or use tables based on both purchase and basic prices are available, the markup by product can be
easily identified.
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2008 global financial crisis. This was followed by a quick recovery and value-added propagation
length peaked again in 2011. These trends are generally consistent with our intuitive image of
the expending fragmentation of production after China’s accession to the WTO in 2001.
Figure 2: Trend in worldwide value-added propagation length, 1995-2011
(a) U(1995) (b) U(2011)
Figure 3: Value-added propagation length (U) by industry based on forward industrial linkages
(Note: An explanation of the country codes (X-axis) and industry codes (Y-axis) are provided
in Appendices 1 and 2, respectively.)
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(a) D(1995) (b) D(2011)
Figure 4: Value-added propagation length (D) by industry based on backward industrial link-
ages
At the industry level, U and D have different economic explanations. The industrial U
is based on the forward industrial linkage representing the distance from a specific industry
(producers) to consumers. Therefore, U can be used as a proxy to reflect the position (up-
streamness or downstreamness) of an industry in value chains. In order to check whether this
indicator works well and matches our intuitive image of industries’ positions in GVCs, we use
the WIOD to calculate U for selected countries by industry and show the result in Figure 3.
As mentioned previously, the larger the U indicator, the more upstream the position of
the relevant industry in value chains. Clearly, certain industries are located at the upstream
portion of value chains (far from consumers) for most countries. These industries include raw
material industries such as mining (2); manufacturing industries that produce fundamental
parts and components such as basic metals (12), pulp and paper (7), wood (6), and chemicals
(9); and utility industries as electricity, gas, and water supply (17)3. Industries that are located
at the downstream portion of value chains (closer to consumers) mainly produce final goods or
services for customers. These downstream industries include food (3), hotels and restaurants
(22), construction (18), private households with employed persons (35), public administration
(31), health and social work (33), and education (32). These results are very consistent with our
intuitive and natural image of industries’ positions in value chains. The remaining industries are
3The figure in parentheses indicates the original industry codes used in the WIOD. For more detail, refer to
Appendix 1.
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located between the upstream and downstream positions. For some industries, their positions
are partly a result of the relatively rough industry classification used. For example, goods
such as agriculture (1) and services such as air transport (25) can represent either intermediate
inputs by industries or final consumption by household. The position rankings for industries
are relatively stable when investigating the time-series calculation results for all countries in the
WIOD (the situations for 1995 and 2011 are shown here for reference). Though the evolution
of industrial and trade structure may impact the position of industries, the general position
of most industries are not likely to change frequently or significantly since the most important
determinants of position are inherent properties of an industry.
On the other hand, the indicator D is based on the backward industrial linkage which
measures the distance from a specific final product to all producers. By definition, this indicator
is difficult to use as a proxy for the position of an industry in value chains, but it can show how
far a specific final product is from the value-added creators. We show the calculation results
for D by country and industry in Figure 4. This indicator also looks relatively stable over
time. However, it shows a very different ranking comparing to that of U in Figure 3. Most
of the manufacturing products have relatively longer value-added propagation lengths, while
most services shows relatively short lengths. This is intuitively understood because producing
manufacturing products requires various intermediate inputs which are produced at stages
further upstream. As a result, the larger the D indicator is, the more complex the production
process of the final product is. In this meaning, D can be considered a proxy for the complexity
of the production technology for a specific final product.
3.2 Examples of smile curves in GVCs
Once the measurement results are available for the strength and length of connections between
countries or industries, we can confront the challenge of drawing the smile curves in various
conceptual value chains. Here, a good starting point for us to consider is the case of the iPhone.
However, in the existing inter-country IO tables, it is difficult to isolate the iPhone industry
individually. Here, we first take the industry category of electrical and optical equipment (14)
in the WIOD as a proxy to show how and to what extent countries and industries are involved
in the value chain of China’s exports of electrical products (which includes the iPhone).
As shown in Figure 5, the Y-axis gives the industrial value-added rate (value-added gained
by producing one unit US$ output); the X-axis gives the distance, measured by the value-added
propagation length, between a specific industry that is a participant in the corresponding value
chain and the world consumers. The size of the circles represents the absolute value-added
gained by joining the corresponding value chain(Unit: million US$ at constant prices); the
smooth line is fitted by local polynomial regression smoothing weighted by their value-added
gained; and the shadowed area shows the confidence interval around the smoothed line.
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(a) 1995 (b) 2011
Figure 5: Value chains for Chinese exports of electrical and optical equipment
Note: The letters and figures along the smile curve indicate the benefiting countries and
industries (for an explanation of these codes, see Appendices 1 and 2).
Clearly, the value chain for Chinese exports of electrical and optical equipment to the world
market appears as a smile curve for both 1995 and 20114. Several observations can be made
from these curves. First, for both years we find that China’s electrical and optical equipment
industry (14) is the largest beneficiary in terms of value-added gain in this value chain. This
is self-evident since China’s electrical and optical equipment industry itself should be the most
impacted industry by China’s production of electrical and optical equipment exports through
the backward and intra-industrial linkages. Second, many other Chinese domestic industries
also benefited by participating in the pre-fabrication stages of this value chain. This is also self-
evident since most of intermediate inputs needed to produce electrical and optical equipment
in China are presumed to come from the Chinese domestic market. Third, the electrical and
optical equipment industries in other countries located in the upstream portion of this value
chain also get a relatively large portion of the value-added gain. This is mainly because of the
cross-border, intra-industrial trade. Lastly, after-service industries such as wholesale (20) and
inland transportation (23) in the US, Japan, and EU are the main beneficiaries in the post-
fabrication stage of this value chain. This is also easy to understand since Chinese electrical and
optical equipment exported to the US, Japan, and EU need to be delivered to their domestic
consumers, mainly through the use of their domestic wholesale and transportation service
industries.
In terms of the evolution of the smile curves in Figure 5, the main finding is that the
whole curve moves down. This movement implies that the value-added rate for most partici-
pants (industries in different countries) in this value chain decreased between 1995 and 2011.
4Here, we pick up the most important participants (countries and sectors) with value-added gain above a
threshold percentage (1% of the total induced value-added in the whole value chain) in both pre-fabrication
and post-fabrication stages in this smile curve. Appendix 3 shows the corresponding smile curve when all the
beneficiary countries and industries are selected.
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In other words, producing one unit of output requires more intermediate inputs, including in-
termediate imports for most participants in this value chain. Using the Chinese electrical and
optical equipment industry as an example, the value-added rate decreased very fast. Several
reasons likely explain this phenomenon. The first reason is increased processing trade in this
industry. The participation pattern of China in the GVC at the early stage is the acceptance of
outsourcing tasks such as the assembly of iPhones. Compared with the traditional production
of electrical and optical equipment, the assembly process is much more labor intensive and
depends on a greater amount of foreign intermediate inputs. Despite the increasing domestic
labor cost at an absolute level in China, decreasing usage of capital and increasing usage of
intermediate imports may result in a decline in the value-added rate for this industry. Second,
the confidence interval of the smile curve becomes much wider. This is mainly because of the
expanding differentials of value-added rates among value chain participants. Evidence strongly
supports this phenomenon. For example, the value-added rate of the US electrical and optical
equipment industry moved up from 0.34 in 1995 to 0.64 in 2011, while the value-added rate
for this industry in China went down from 0.25 in 1995 to 0.18 in 2011. In other words, the
US electrical and optical equipment industry increasingly concentrated on high value-added
production of more complex intermediate goods (e.g., computer processors), whereas China
took on more tasks such as assembling final products with low value-added per unit produc-
tion. Third, the whole length of the smile curve is getting much longer. This reflects the fact
that a higher volume of intermediate goods is produced in subsequent stages or processes across
different countries, and these goods are then exported to other countries for further production.
Fourth, the Chinese electrical and optical equipment industry is located at the low end of the
smile curve, but its value-added gain is increasing in absolute terms (note the change in circle
size between 1995 and 2011). In other words, China is taking an increasingly large piece of the
pie in the value chain, although the value-added gain in producing one unit of electrical goods
in USD is declining.
There is no guarantee that value chains will always look like a smile curve. Figure 6 shows
the mapping result for Mexico’s value chain in term of its exports of electrical and optical
equipment. In 1995, a very clear V-shaped smile curve can be identified. However, in 2011, the
shape of the curve changes significantly and becomes a W-shaped curve. To examine the reasons
behind this phenomenon, we must first look at the evolution of the main players involved in
Mexico’s electrical and optical equipment value chain between 1995 and 2011. In 1995, the
main participants in the pre-fabrication stages of this value chain are composed of Mexican
domestic industries such as chemicals (M9), and metal products (M12), as well as a number of
US industries such as rubber and plastics (U10), machinery (U13), and electrical and optical
equipment (U14). However, at least three factors contributed to the remarkable changes in the
shape of this smile curve. One is the rapidly increasing presence of China in Mexico’s value
chain. As seen in 2011, many low value-added Chinese industries such as chemicals (C9) and
basic metals (C12) replaced other countries’ position in the Mexican value chain and these
Chinese industries became the main players with a relatively large value-added gain in the
pre-fabrication stage of this value chain. The second factor is the rapid technological upgrades
happening in the US electrical and optical equipment industry (U14), which is increasing its
value-added rate and still maintains a relatively large value-added gain. The third factor is the
increasing value-added rate and the absolute value-added gain of Mexico’s service industries
in the pre-fabrication stage. In addition, China’s presence in the high-end of this value chain
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is also noteworthy. For example, China’s financial intermediation (C28) and wholesales (C20)
industries play an increasingly important role in the pre-fabrication and post-fabrication stages
of the Mexican electrical and optical equipment value chain, respectively. This shift may have
also contributed to the overall expansion of Mexico’s electrical product value chain since the
whole length (Y-axis) of this chain increases from 5.4 to 7.3 between 1995 and 2011.
(a) 1995 (b) 2011
Figure 6: Value chains for Mexican exports of electrical and optical equipment
The iPhone is one of the most typical products that have been widely used to explain the
phenomenon of global fragmentation of production. Next, we take up the example of German
and Japanese automobiles to investigate their value chains. Figure 7 shows the value chain for
Japanese auto exports for 1995 and 2011. In general, both figures show a v-shaped smile curve,
while the curve for 2011 looks much deeper and wider than that for 1995. This implies that the
value chain for cars that are produced in Japan and ultimately consumed in foreign countries
has more production stages on average. At the same time, the process of producing one unit
car in this value chain requires more intermediate inputs, including intermediate imports, and
fewer primary inputs. In addition, we find that the most benefiting participants in the pre-
fabrication stages of this value chain are Japanese domestic industries in both years. However,
the differences in value-added rates across domestic industries increased remarkably. Most
notably, the value-added rate for most domestic manufacturing industries decreased between
1995 and 2011. The competitive pressure from foreign participants in the pre-fabrication stages
of this value chain is likely the most important reason for this change. As shown in the chart
for 2011, China’s chemical (C12) and electrical and optical equipment (C14) industries have
become involved in Japan’s auto value chain with a relatively lower value-added rate. For
example, if the price of intermediate inputs and the production technology are the same for
both the Chinese and Japanese chemical industries (12), the Chinese product with a lower
value-added rate should be more competitive.
A similar pattern of change can also be found in the German auto value chain as shown in
Figure 8. Namely, the smile curve is getting much deeper and wider; more foreign participants
including French and Chinese industries with relatively low value-added rates are increasingly
involved in the pre-fabrication stages in the German auto value chain.
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(a) 1995 (b) 2011
Figure 7: Value chains for Japanese auto exports
(a) 1995 (b) 2011
Figure 8: Value chains for German auto exports
In order to focus on the foreign participants in the value chains shown above, we remove
all domestic industries and show only the most benefiting foreign industries in Figures 9 to 12.
Several findings can be made from these figures. First, smile curves for all selected value chains
are becoming much deeper and wider. Second, China’s participation is becoming much more
notable in the Mexican electrical product value chain and the Japanese and German auto value
chains. Third, some eastern EU countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic play a more
important role in the German auto value chain.
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(a) 1995 (b) 2011
Figure 9: Foreign participants in the Chinese electrical and optical equipment value chain
(a) 1995 (b) 2011
Figure 10: Foreign participants in the Mexican electrical and optical equipment value chain
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(a) 1995 (b) 2011
Figure 11: Foreign participants in the Japanese auto value chain
(a) 1995 (b) 2011
Figure 12: Foreign participants in the German auto value chain
4 Conclusion remarks
The increasing complexity and sophistication of GVCs brings an urgent challenge to policy
makers since “you can’t manage what you can’t measure.” One of the most important starting
points for better understanding GVCs is to first develop good measures that can clearly show
the position and degree of participation of countries and industries in GVCs. For example, the
logic of the “smile curve” has been widely used to explain the different roles that developed and
developing countries play in the value-added creation process of globally fragmented production.
However, to the best of our knowledge, this smile curve “hypothesis” has never been carefully
investigated by using real data with explicit consideration on both the benefits to, and the
position of, participating countries and industries in GVCs until now.
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The main difficulty in mapping countries and industries in GVCs along a smile curve is how
to consistently measure both the length and strength of value-added propagation between pro-
ducers and consumers based on various perspectives of GVCs. The existing IO-based measures
of length such as APL and the concepts of upstreamness and downstreamness give us a good
starting point, but lack an overall and consistent accounting framework from the perspectives
of both producers and consumers. This paper shows that the length of value-added propagation
can be measured by using either Leontief’s forward industrial linkage or Leontief’s backward
industrial linkage. At the lowest level between a specific industry (producer) and a specific
final product (consumer) and at the highest level (aggregating all countries and industries),
there is no difference between these two measures. However, at the country and industry levels,
these measures have very different economic explanations. Namely, the length of value-added
propagation based on forward industrial linkage measures the distance from a specific indus-
try to consumers; while the backward industrial linkage length measures the distance from a
specific final product to producers. Therefore, the former can be used to identify the position
(upstreamness or downstreamness) of industries in value chains, while the latter can be used
to identify the level of complexity in the production processes of final products.
Another important contribution of the paper is that we provide various conceptual GVC
settings based on the measure of backward industrial linkage. This can help us separate a value
chain into pre-fabrication stages and post-fabrication stages, and at the same time identify the
countries or industries benefiting most at each stage in terms of their absolute value-added gain.
By combining the measures of position and participation level for countries and industries in a
given conceptual GVC, the so-called smile curve can be mapped.
Using time-series data from the WIOD from 1995 to 2011, smile curves for various con-
ceptual GVC are mapped and presented, including for Chinese and Mexican electrical product
value chains and German and Japanese auto value chains. Most smile curves have been getting
much deeper and wider over time. This clearly reflects the deepening vertical specialization
and the expanding cross-border fragmentation of production in the corresponding value chains
during the data period. At the country level, Chinese manufacturing industries, especially the
electrical and optical equipment industry, with the lowest value-added rate enhanced their par-
ticipation in the pre-fabrication stage of the Mexican electrical product value chain, as well as
in both the Japanese and German auto value chains. In contrast, the US electrical and optical
equipment industry is still one of the main participants in the Chinese and Mexican electrical
product value chain and the Japanese auto value chain, but these value chains seem to be ex-
periencing a very rapid technology upgrades as a result of the US industry’s high value-added
rate.
The method of mapping smile curves proposed in the paper can be considered a touchstone
for better understanding of the position and value-added gain from participation in various
GVCs by countries and industries. The relevant indicators can provide a useful tool in analyzing
the determinants of a country’s role in GVCs as well as providing policy-oriented analysis of
how to help countries be involved in, and make upgrades to, GVCs.
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Appendix 1 Country or country group classification
Country name Code EU Country name Code EU Country name Code EU
AUS A AUT
√
BEL
√
BGR
√
BRA B CAN CA
CHN C CYP
√
CZE
√
DEU
√
DNK
√
ESP
√
EST
√
FIN
√
FRA
√
GBR
√
GRC
√
HUN
√
IDN ID IND IN IRL
√
ITA
√
JPN J KOR K
LTU
√
LUX
√
LVA
√
MEX M MLT
√
NLD
√
POL
√
PRT
√
ROM
√
RUS RU SVK
√
SVN
√
SWE
√
TUR TU TWN T
USA U RoW R
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Appendix 2 WIOD industry classification
Sectors No. Sectors Abbreviation
1 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing Agr
2 Mining and Quarrying Min
3 Food, Beverages and Tobacco Foo
4 Textiles and Textile Products Tex
5 Leather, Leather and Footwear Lea
6 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork Woo
7 Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing Pul
8 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel Cok
9 Chemicals and Chemical Products Che
10 Rubber and Plastics Rub
11 Other Non-Metallic Mineral OMin
12 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal Bas
13 Machinery, Nec Mac
14 Electrical and Optical Equipment Ele
15 Transport Equipment Tra
16 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling Man
17 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply Gas
18 Construction Con
19 Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel Sal
20 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles Who
21 Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods Ret
22 Hotels and Restaurants Hot
23 Inland Transport InT
24 Water Transport WaT
25 Air Transport AiT
26 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies OS
27 Post and Telecommunications Pos
28 Financial Intermediation Fin
29 Real Estate Activities Rea
30 Renting of M&Eq and Other Business Activities Ren
31 Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security Pub
32 Education Edu
33 Health and Social Work Hea
34 Other Community, Social and Personal Services OCom
35 Private Households with Employed Persons Pir
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Appendix 3 A smile curve example
Figure 13: The smile curve for Chinese exports of electrical and optical equipment with all
beneficiary countries and industries (2011)
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